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Over the past several years, increased demands for coastal
resources have created disputes over the respective rights of pri-
vate landowners and the public in the bayous, tidal streams, and
beaches of the Mississippi Gulf Coast. These legal rights are de-
termined by the public trust doctrine, a concept that has
evolved in American jurisprudence from Roman and English
law.1 Its philosophic underpinning is that seas and shores, and
the resources found within, represent a vast, inexhaustible com-
mons whose wealth can and should be shared by all.
Mississippi's public trust doctrine has its roots in the Eng-
lish common law.2 Prior to the signing of the Magna Charta in
1215, the English monarchy claimed sovereign ownership in
ocean and coastal lands and waters, and the resources contained
therein. Over a period of time, as the King granted many coastal
waterways to lords loyal to him, sovereign lands came to be
divested in a manner indistinguishable from other private prop-
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I See generally Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473, passim (1969)(historic origins of public trust
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Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, passim (1970)(origins of public trust law).
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erty. The Magna Charta, which has been interpreted to have
brought to a close such privatization of public lands, established
the roots of the modern law of public trust.' It permitted the
monarchy to retain sovereign rights in tidal lands and resources
up to the high-water mark, but prohibited exclusive alienation
to private parties for private use. Thus, a trust in favor of the
public was impressed upon such lands.
Mississippi obtained ownership of its tidelands below mean
high tide from the United States government under the equal
footing doctrine, a legal principle which provides that states en-
tering the Union after its initial creation came in on an "equal
footing" with other states.4 Because the original states had re-
served their tidelands and navigable waters and held them in
trust for the public, Mississippi became owner of its tidelands
upon statehood. Prior to statehood, the federal government
owned these lands in a similar trust capacity.6
3 Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 366 (1842).
The question is not free from doubt, and the authorities referred to in the
English books cannot, perhaps, be altogether reconciled. But . . . the question
must be regarded as settled in England against the right of the king since the
Magna Charta to make such a grant [of submerged lands] . . . . But the exis-
tence of a doubt as to the right of the king to make such a grant after Magna
Charta, would of itself show how fixed has been the policy of that government
on this subject for the last six hundred years; and how carefully it has pre-
served this common right for the benefit of the public.
Id. at 410, 412.
' Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
The manner in which the new states were to be admitted into the union, ac-
cording to the ordinance of 1787 [Northwest Ordinance], as expressed therein,
is as follows: '. . . such state shall be admitted by its delegates into the con-
gress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original states in all
respects whatever.'
Id. at 222. This doctrine was extended to ensure that "new" states have the same rights
as the original states in the tide waters, and in the lands below the high-water mark,
within their respective jurisdictions. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1893).
1 Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891).
It is the settled rule of law in this court that absolute property in, and domin-
ion and sovereignty over, the soils under the tide waters in the original States
were reserved to the several States, and that the new States since admitted
have the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction in that behalf as the original
States possess within their respective borders. Upon the acquisition of the ter-
ritory from Mexico the United States acquired the title to tide lands equally
with the title to upland; but with respect to the former they held it only in
trust for the future States that might be erected out of such territory.
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The extent of public rights in tidelands varies from state to
state.' And within state public trust case law, courts have had
difficulty in establishing the bounds of the trust. Mississippi is
no exception. Several property issues have arisen in Mississippi's
public trust law. First, what is the geographical boundary be-
tween private and public trust land? Second, to what extent can
the state alienate trust lands in fee? Third, what private and
public uses are protected by the public trust doctrine? And
fourth, what public rights are impressed upon owners whose
property lies upland from public trust tidelands? This article ex-
plores these issues and how they are treated under Mississippi
statutory and common law.
GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY OF TIDAL PUBLIC TRUST LANDS
1. Ebb and Flow Test
In its earliest public trust decision, Martin v. O'Brien,7 the
Mississippi Supreme Court established the high water mark as
the inland geographic boundary of public trust lands.8 One of
the court's most coherent discussions on the subject is found in
State ex rel. Rice v. Stewart.9 This case involved the ownership
of submerged lands in Bayou Bernard, a navigable inlet of the
Mississippi Sound. 10 Contending that they owned the bed of the
bayou and the minerals contained therein, the adjacent upland
Id. at 183.
1 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
• . . there is no universal and uniform law upon the subject; but that each
State has dealt with the lands under the tide waters within its borders accord-
ing to its own views of justice and policy, reserving its own control over such
lands, or granting rights therein to individuals or corporations, whether owners
of the adjoining uplands or not, as it considered for the best interests of the
public.
Id. at 26. See, e.g. City of Newport Beach v. Fager, 102 P.2d 438, 441 (Ca. App.
1940)(legislature may alienate tidelands from public trust if public interest not substan-
tially impaired); Orbrecht v. National Gypsum Co., 105 N.W. 2d 143, 149 (Mich.
1960)(beds of Great Lakes alienable in exceptional circumstances); State Laws Bd. v.
Heuicer, 548 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Or. App. 1976)(state can not grant away public right to use
tidelands for commerce and navigation).
34 Miss. 21 (1857).
Martin v. O'Brien, 34 Miss. 21, 36 (1857).
' 184 Miss. 202, 184 So. 44 (1938), sugg. error overruled, 185 So. 247 (1939).
10 State ex rel. Rice v. Stewart, 184 Miss. at 219, 184 So. at 45.
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owners established a commercial sand and gravel mining opera-
tion in the bayou.-1 Citing its ownership under the public trust
doctrine, the state filed suit to enjoin the mining operations. 2
In its opinion, the court restated its holding in Martin that
the state holds lands under navigable tidal waters below mean
high tide in trust for the people. 3 It then further defined the
term "navigable" to include all waters subject to the ebb and the
flow of the tide, regardless of navigability in fact.
The phrase 'navigable river,' has a technical meaning in the
Common Law. A river is navigable in the technical sense, as
high up from its mouth as the tide flows .... Above that it
may be a common highway, subject to the use of the public for
navigation according to the common law acceptation of the
term, but it is not technically a navigable river. The soil under
a river which is navigable in the technical sense, does not be-
long to the riparian owners, but to the public. 4
Noting that no sound policy reason exists for distinguishing
ownership of beds beneath freshwater (which extends to the
middle of the stream with a navigation easement in favor of the
public) and tidal rivers, the court nonetheless restated its ac-
ceptance of the English common law public trust doctrine. 5
As recently as 1986, in Cinque Bambini v. State,'6 the court
affirmed this general rule, but with a curious line of reasoning.
The case arose from a dispute over rights to oil and gas on ap-
proximately 600 acres of marshland in Hancock County.17 For
almost a century and a half, a succession of owners of the land
in question had paid property taxes to the state. Private owner-
ship was not questioned until 1977 when the state granted min-
eral leases throughout the area.' 8 The leases contained assertions
of state ownership, under the public trust doctrine, of sub-
"' Id.
12 Id.
'3 Id. at 224, 184 So. at 47.
Id. at 225, 184 So. at 47.
'5 Id. at 230, 184 So. at 50.
16 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986), aff'd, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, - U.S.
__, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
' Cinque Bambini v. State, 491 So. 2d at 510.
IS Id. at 511.
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merged lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide up to mean
high-water mark, by virtue of the "ebb and flow" test. 9 The
Cinque Bambini Partnership, contended however, that the pub-
lic trust extends only to submerged tidelands that are "naviga-
ble-in-fact.
' 20
In its reaffirmation of state ownership of tidelands up to the
mean high tide line, regardless of actual navigability, the court
virtually ignored the Stewart line of reasoning. Instead, it re-
analyzed the issue in light of federal law.21 This approach re-
quired the court to determine whether extension of the public
trust doctrine to inland navigable waters by the United States
Supreme Court in The Genessee Chiefs2 in 1851 had resulted in
a restriction of the "ebb and flow" test for public trust jurisdic-
tion in tidal lands.2s  Drawing an analogy to navigable
freshwaters, the Mississippi court stated that the trust applies to
both the navigable and non-navigable portions of a freshwater
waterway up to the high-water mark. 4 It then equated the
"mean high tide" line with the "high-water" mark of a river.2
Because the tidelands granted to Mississippi under the "equal
footing" doctrine are those fronting the Gulf of Mexico - un-
1" Id. at 514. Utilizing the "ebb and flow" test, the public trust would be construed
to include tidally influenced non-navigable waters. Id.
20 Id. at 513.
22 The court merely mentioned the Stewart holding in support of its own conclusion
under the federal law analysis. Id. at 516. The court deemed the issue to be a federal
question, as the federal government had title to the lands prior to statehood, and as the
allocation of land to tide state, to private citizens, and to the public trust was governed
by the "equal footing" doctrine. Id. at 513.
22 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). The Genesse Chief case was precipitated by a colli-
sion between two vessels on Lake Ontario. The appellant contended that the federal
court system did not have jurisdiction over the case, as admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion "is limited to cases occurring upon waters within the ebb and flow of the tide." Id.
at 447. The court examined the reasons for the initial grant of admiralty jurisdiction to
the federal government, and determined that the same reasons extend to navigable
streams and lakes. Id. at 453-54. Accordingly, the court held that admiralty jurisdiction
encompassed navigable inland waters as well as those influenced by the tide. Id. Subse-
quent to this expansion of admiralty jurisdiction, the Supreme Court expanded the
boundaries of the public trust to include navigable inland waters. Cinque Bambini, 491
So. 2d at 514.
23 Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 513.
24 Id. at 514.
22 Id. at 514-15.
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questionably a navigable body of water - the court reasoned
that the trust therefore extends from the state's border on the
Gulf to the mean high tide line.2 6 Despite the strained reasoning
of the opinion, the resultant holding is consistent with past deci-
sions of the court.
2. Ambulatory Boundaries
Because coastal tidelands are a dynamic, constantly chang-
ing ecosystem, their geographic boundaries are "ambulatory," or
mobile. Wetlands are created and destroyed regularly by both
natural and man-made forces, described in legal terminology as
accretion17 , reliction 28 , and avulsion29. To what extent do the le-
gal boundaries of trust land follow these changes? The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court has taken the position that accretions that
develop adjacent to the shore become the property of the upland
owner.30 The court justifies this holding on the theory that it
protects an owner's littoral right of access to the water.3 1 Title to
noncontiguous fast lands that emerge from tidal waters, how-
ever, is held by the state in trust for the public in the same man-
ner as submerged tidelands.3 2 Accreted lands adjacent to an is-
land belong to the owner of the island, even when such
1s Id. at 515-16. The court found further support for its conclusion in the fact that
"tide" terminology has continued in use since The Genessee Chief, thus indicating that
the "navigable waters" test is an extension rather than replacement of the "ebb and
flow" rule. Id. at 515.
11 "Accretion" refers to the "addition of portions of soil, by gradual deposition
through the operation of natural causes, to that already in possession of owner." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 36 (4th ed. 1957).
2" "Reliction" is an "increase of the land by the permanent withdrawal or retroces-
sion of the sea or a river." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1455 (4th ed. 1957).
" "Avulsion" is the "removal of a considerable quantity of soil from the land of one
man, and its deposit upon or annexation to the land of another, suddenly and by the
perceptible action of water." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 173 (4th ed. 1957).
"o H.K. Porter Co. v. Jackson County, 324 So. 2d 746, 750 (Miss. 1975); Interna-
tional Paper Co. v. Mississippi State Highway Dep't, 271 So. 2d 395, 398 (Miss. 1972);
Harrison County v. Guice, 244 Miss. 95, 106, 140 So. 2d 838, 841-42 (1962).
s Harrison County v. Guice, 244 Miss. 95, 101, 140 So. 2d 838, 841-42 (1962).
31 International Paper Co. v. Mississippi State Highway Dep't, 271 So. 2d 395, 398-
99 (Miss. 1972). The court noted that the land mass belonged to the state when sub-
merged as part of a state-owned bay floor, and apparently reasoned that elevation of the
noncontiguous mass above the water surface did not merit review of title to the land. Id.
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accretions meet the mainland. 3
In 1962, the court was first presented the opportunity to de-
termine whether lands that were once subject to the public trust
could inure to the upland owner when artificially filled. In Har-
rison County v. Guice", the county filled shallow bottoms below
mean high tide, as well as upland on Guice's property, in order
to protect Highway 90 and the seawall that separated it from the
Mississippi Sound." The court found this to be an artificial ac-
cretion erected by "strangers to the upland title."" Such accre-
tions, decided the court, become the property of the upland
owner, even though the accretions were created at public ex-
pense and the submerged land that was filled to make the beach
previously belonged to the state.3 7 The court reached this con-
clusion by analogy to the principle that owners whose property
adjoins tidelands cannot extend their lands by artificially re-
claiming state-owned bottoms.3 s The court stated that protec-
tion of the littoral owner's right of access to the water is the
reason for such a rule.30
A federal court opinion arising from the same controversy as
Guice came to the opposite conclusion. In United States v. Har-
rison County," The Fifth Circuit rejected the Guice holding,
reasoning instead that Section 95 of the Mississippi Constitution
of 1890 supersedes the common law doctrine of accretion." Sec-
tion 95 provides that "lands belonging to, or under the control of
the state, shall never be donated directly or indirectly to private
corporations or individuals.'42 Because of this provision, the
court ruled, private upland owners cannot take ownership of for-
33 H.K. Porter Co. v. Jackson County, 324 So. 2d 746, 751 (Miss. 1975).
34 244 Miss. 95, 140 So. 2d 838 (1962).
" Id. at 839. Work was financed with a combination of federal and county funds to
remedy an erosion problem associated with the original construction of the seawall. Id.
The county secured an easement from Ms. Guice, but only 50' wide. Id. Ms. Guice owned
approximately 175-250 feet south of Highway 90 at the time of granting of easement and
emplacement of the sloping beach. Id.




40 399 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1968).
11 Id. at 491.
42 Miss. CONST. art. IV, § 95.
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merly submerged lands.43 This reasoning allowed specific per-
formance of a contract entered into in 1951 by the federal gov-
ernment and Harrison County, in which the government
awarded 1.3 million dollars to the state of Mississippi for the
construction of 17 miles of beach in Harrison County. In ex-
change for such public funds, the county agreed that the beaches
would be made available to the public. The court granted public
access to such beaches for sunbathing, recreation, and other uses
appropriate to a sand beach, so long as such use did not unrea-
sonably interfere with the littoral rights of the upland owners."
These conflicting decisions leave the status of ownership of
the man-made beaches on Mississippi's coast and the viability of
the common law doctrine of accretions in doubt. Section 95 of
the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 is not mentioned in the Gu-
ice opinion, so it is unclear whether that issue was raised and
considered. Dicta in the Mississippi Supreme Court's latest pub-
lic trust case suggest acceptance of the Guice holding."1 As de-
velopment pressures on Mississippi's coast increase, conflicts be-
tween public and private rights on the beach are bound to arise.
Therefore, it is likely that the court will be called upon to re-
solve the two opinions.
If the court were to accept the Guice holding in a subse-
quent case, it would create a no-win situation for the governing
body charged with overseeing man-made beaches, upland own-
ers, and the public. The court could reconcile Guice with the
Harrison County decision, however, by applying the common
law doctrine of implied dedication. The dedication doctrine
makes it possible for a landowner either to transfer full owner-
ship of his land to the public or to grant an easement to the
public for certain uses.4" To be legally enforceable, two elements
11 Harrison County, 399 F.2d at 491.
44 Id.
41 Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 519. The court referred to the Guice opinion as
support for the proposition that the deposit of alluvial soil upon the "margin of water"
inures to the benefit of the owner of the shoreland. Id. This reference was made as part
of a summary of the contours of Mississippi Law governing the title of coastal lands, and
did not address the inconsistency presented by the Harrison County decision.
41 "Dedication is the term applied to a transfer of the ownership of land or of a
privilege to use it to the public for a public purpose." 6A POWELL, LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY § 926 (1986).
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must be present: an intent on the part of a property owner to
dedicate and a valid acceptance by the public. 7
An owner's intent to dedicate may be expressly given or im-
plied from his failure to object to continued use of his property
by the public.4' It is crucial, though, that a non-expressed inten-
tion be clearly and unequivocally manifested. Also, acceptance
may be either express or implied through formal action or use by
the public.
4 9
To date, application of the doctrine of implied dedication in
Mississippi has been limited to roads and parks.50 The test es-
tablished by the court requires "long use for a specific public
purpose, the discontinuance of which constitutes a violation of
good faith to the public and to those who have acquired prop-
erty with a view to the use contemplated by the dedication."' It
seems clear that such a test can be met in relation to Missis-
sippi's beaches. Members of the public have been using the
beaches openly and without interference.52 Because use need not
be constant, it would be irrelevant that public use diminishes
during the winter months. In many instances, counties are ex-
pending funds to maintain them. In addition, local governments
routinely grant privilege licenses to beach vendors without ob-
'7 Id. at § 926 (2).
" "An implied dedication may arise by operation of law from the acts and conduct
of a landowner." Id.
49 Id.
"0 See, e.g., City of Louisville v. Hull, 292 So. 2d 177, 179 (Miss. 1974)(recognized
implied dedication doctrine applicable to property owned by a municipality); Armstrong
v. Itawamba County, 16 So. 2d 752, 757 (Miss. 1944)(recognized implied dedication of
road which had been used by public and maintained with public funds for about twenty
years); Harrison County v. Seal, 66 Miss. 129, 129, 5 So. 622, 622 (1889)(acceptance of
dedication of road does not have to be express but can be inferred from public use);
Kinnare v. Gregory, 55 Miss. 612, 620-21 (1878)(early recognition of implied dedication
where court enjoined obstruction of highway by private party).
City of Louisville v. Hull, 292 So. 2d 177, 179 (Miss. 1974).
' This writer knows of only two exceptions. First, formerly blacks were excluded
from beaches which instigated the Guice and Harrison County decisions. More recently,
a controversy has developed over public use of the beaches of Deer Island. Deer Island is
a 500-600 acre island located in the Mississippi Sound, offshore from the coastal city of
Biloxi. A private developer has attempted to restrict public access to all but a small
portion of the island that is owned by the city of Biloxi. Prior to the developer's acquisi-
tion of the property, the public freely used the island for recreational purposes. As a
result, an uneasy tension now prevails over public use of the island.
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taining prior permission of adjacent landowners. Thus, it would
be a violation of good faith to the public to discontinue such
long use for public recreational purposes. The court has held
continued use over a period of time, combined with maintenance
at public expense, to be sufficient to find implied dedication of a
road s.5 There is no reason that the result should differ when the
issue is public use of a beach.
5 4
The Court in Cinque Bambini answered affirmatively the
question of whether .public trust lands can be enlarged by the
natural inland expansion of tidewaters.5 The court reasoned
that such a ruling is logically consistent with the principle of
allowing private freshwater riparian landowners to benefit from
accretions.5 6 It specifically declined to rule on the issue of the
status of trust lands that become fast lands through reliction.
5 7
It seems likely that such a situation would be treated in the
same way as natural accretions to upland property. In both in-
stances, tidewaters are replaced by land; the only difference is
the manner in which the land is formed. If the policy reason for
granting accretions to the upland owner is to protect such
owner's right to access to the water, then the legal result should
be the same. 8 However, as discussed above, section 95 of the
Mississippi Constitution of 1890 could be interpreted to prevent
' Armstrong v. Itawamba County, 16 So. 2d 752, 756-57 (Miss. 1944).
" Texas and California courts have recognized implied dedications of beaches. See
County of Los Angeles v. Berk, 605 P.2d 381, 391 (Cal. 1980)(found implied dedication of
beaches, slope, and bluff even though public thought property was private); Gion v. City
of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 57-58 (Cal. 1974)(once implied dedication complete, subse-
quent owner cannot prevent public use); Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W. 2d
923, 935-37 (Texas 1964)(found implied dedication of beach from mean low tide mark to
seaward side of vegetation line).
" Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 519-20.
56 Id. at 520.
67 Id. at 519.
"8 The court in Guice hints at this result. It defines "accretion" broadly to include
lands created by the gradual recession of water, which is technically known as "relic-
tion". If the court understood reliction to be a subset of accretions, then relicted lands
are logically treated the same as accreted lands. "Ordinarily, accretion means the gradual
deposit of alluvial soil upon the margin of the water or the gradual recession of the
water." Guice, 244 Miss. at 99, 140 So. 2d at 842. The court appears to be confused on
this matter, though. The court in Cinque Bambini cites Guice for this proposition, but
on the next page says reliction has never been decided by the court. Cinque Bambini,
491 So. 2d at 519.
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this result.
Avulsions, on the other hand, have been held not to affect
title or boundaries." According to the court, this principle holds
true whether the avulsion is natural or artificially induced, such
as through dredging operations.6 0 Therefore, when an upland
owner dredges his land to create a boat slip, he retains owner-
ship of that part of his property that becomes "wet" as a result.
ALIENATION OF PUBLIC TRUST LANDS
Historically, the Mississippi Supreme Court has been erratic
in its position regarding the extent to which the state can divest
itself of tidelands. Early in the history of Mississippi public
trust case law, the court held in Martin v. O'Brien that state-
owned tidelands could "by grant, become private property, or
the subject of an exclusive private right."61 Following this rea-
soning, the court upheld the right of a municipality to grant to
an individual who was not a riparian landowner the exclusive
right to erect, operate, and maintain a public wharf in the Mis-
sissippi Sound.2 Furthermore, the decision allowed a riparian
landowner to erect a private wharf in public trust waters adja-
cent to his property. 3 The wharf was to be used for landing and
shipping his own property, but not that of others." However, in
keeping with its assertion that the state could freely alienate
lands below the high water mark, the court stated that the right
to construct a private wharf could be taken away by the legisla-
B, Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 520. This proposition has been well-settled law in
the United States as regards fresh water since 1904 when, in the case of Missouri v.
Nebraska, 196 U.S. 23 (1904), the United States Supreme Court stated: "It is equally
well settled that where a stream which is a boundary, from any cause suddenly abandons
its old and seeks a new bed, such change of channel works no change of boundary; ...
This sudden and rapid change of channel is termed, in law, avulsion." Missouri v. Ne-
braska, 196 U.S. at 35.
0 Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 520. "Put more broadly, under the laws of this
state, neither artificially created water courses, inlets, slips, marinas and the like, nor
physical improvement or alteration made thereto, become a part of the public trust, even
thought they become tidally affected." Id.
" Martin v. O'Brien, 34 Miss. 21, 36 (1857).
62 Id. at 38.
1 Id. at 37.
4Id.
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ture. 5 This decision indicated that such a right was not incident
to the ownership of property bordered by tidelands.8 6
The ability of the state to grant fee simple title in public
trust tidelands to private parties for private purposes was re-
stricted seventy-five years later in Money v. Wood.67 Here, the
plaintiffs challenged the state's right to sell submerged lands be-
tween Deer Island and the mainland in Biloxi "for the purpose
of constructing and erecting an artificial island, with hotels, bou-
levards, and residences for the private purposes of the appel-
lants." 8 The sale was made pursuant to a statute that permitted
the state land commissioner to sell certain public lands.6 9 In
finding the sale void, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that
the state, as trustee, could not dispose of these lands, if to do so
would be inconsistent with the purpose for which the trust ex-
ists." Unfortunately, the court shed no light on the exact nature
of this purpose. It stated further that section 81 of the Missis-
sippi Constitution of 189071 supports the court's decision to align
itself with those states holding that trust lands cannot be con-
veyed in fee to private owners for private purposes.72 The court
specifically recognized, however, that some states allow convey-
ance of fee title to public trust lands, even if doing so deprives
the people of future control of these lands.73
This decision directly contradicts the court's holding in
Martin, which was not alluded to in the opinion. While it is un-
clear why the court chose to ignore Martin, two important
events arguably influenced its decision. First, between the Mar-
' Id. at 36.
66 Id. ". . . and it also follows that the position ... that the owners of lands lying
on the seashore have the right to build wharves for their own use into the sea adjoining
the front of their lands, and cannot be deprived of that right by grant under legislative
authority, cannot be maintained." Id.
67 152 Miss. 17, 118 So. 357 (1928).
'8 Id. at 24, 118 So. at 358.
6 Id. The statute provided for the sale of "all accretions of land not the subject of
private ownership, and particularly those accretions near the mouth of the Pascagoula
River . . . at the same price as swamp and overflow lands .. 1906 Miss. Laws 2919.
70 Money, 152 Miss. at 27, 118 So. at 359.
7' Miss. CONsT. art IV. § 81. "The Legislature shall never authorize the permanent
obstruction of any of the navigable waters of the State. Id.
72 Money, 152 Miss. at 27, 118 So. at 359.
73 Id.
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tin and Money decisions, the United States Supreme Court, in
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois74 , had occasion to interpret
the right of states to alienate public trust lands. The issue in
Illinois Central concerned a grant by the Illinois legislature of
over 1,000 acres of shoreline on Lake Michigan. The United
States Supreme Court held the grant invalid under the public
trust doctrine, ruling that such a grant would be permissible
only if it did not result in public uses being subjected to private
interest.
75
Second, section 81 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890,
which prohibits the permanent obstruction of the navigable wa-
ters of the state, was adopted after the Martin decision. The
court stated that the purpose of this section was to align Missis-
sippi with those states that follow the holding of Illinois Cen-
tral.76 The court then cited an earlier decision that interpreted
the statute involved in Money to be applicable only to rural
lands valuable for timber, pasturage, or agriculture. 7 Relying on
this definition, the court construed the statute narrowly to ex-
clude tidelands, which the court classified as water rather than
land.78
These contrasting opinions could also indicate a change in
philosophy regarding the scope of the state's trust duties. The
court's language in Martin demonstrates a strong conviction
that the legislature has an unrestricted right to alienate trust
lands to private persons for private purposes. By contrast, the
Money court indicated that such a divesture by the legislature
would be a breach of its duty to the public, even absent section
" 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
71 Id. at 452-53.
11 Money, 152 Miss. at 29, 118 So. at 359. "It seems to us that section 81 of the
Constitution was adopted by the Constitutional Convention for the purpose of aligning
this state with the line of authorities which hold that the state cannot convey in fee such
rights to private owners for private purposes. We are satisfied that this section of the
Constitution applies to the waters here involved, and to the lands under such waters, and
that such waters are regarded as navigable." Id.
7 Id. In Huber v. Freret, 135 Miss. 235, 103 So. 3 (1925) the court rejected applica-
tion of the statute to the grant of land located in the heart of downtown Jackson. Huber,
135 Miss. at 239, 103 So. at 4. In doing so the court limited application of tide statute to
"those public lands which are usually bought and sold by acreage - in other words, prop-
erty commonly known as rural lands . Id.
78 Id. at 30, 118 So. at 359-60.
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81 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. "It is unnecessary to
decide whether it would be possible for the state to sell such
lands in fee independent of a constitutional restriction. It cer-
tainly would be a breach of duty for the legislature to do so
"179
Thirty years later the court, in Giles v. City of Biloxi 0 dis-
played another shift in attitude regarding private development
of tidelands. Although Giles dealt not with the public trust doc-
trine, but with a provision of the Mississippi constitution
prohibiting the granting of state lands to private persons except
by general law,81 the language of the court presages its next pub-
lic lands alienation case. Giles concerned an effort to develop
Deer Island, a nearshore barrier island, into a resort. To facili-
tate such development, the Mississippi legislature, by a local and
private law, established the Biloxi Bridge and Park Commission
and empowered it to lease and sell certain reclaimed submerged
lands around Deer Island. After holding this legislation uncon-
stitutional under Section 90(u), the court stated that it was
"keenly aware of the public interest involved and the desirabil-
ity of developing the island. This decision does not mean that
this court will not look upon any future plan for developing Deer
Island with as much favor as the constitution and laws of the
state permit."82
The court kept its word eight years later in Treuting v.
Bridge and Park Commission83 when it was called upon to rule
upon the ability of the legislature to authorize, pursuant to gen-
eral legislation, fee simple transfer of title to tidelands. In 1960
the Mississippi legislature passed a statute authorizing coastal
municipalities to establish bridge and park commissions who
were authorized to purchase islands and submerged lands in the
Mississippi Sound. 4 After purchase, a commission could reclaim
and sell them if they were "unnecessary for park or recreational
" Id., 118 So. at 359.
80 237 Miss. 35, 112 So. 2d 815 (1959).
SI MIss. CONST. art IV, § 90 (u).
"2 Giles, 239 Miss. at 44, 112 So. 2d at 824.
"3 199 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1967).
84 Id. at 629.
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purposes for the benefit of the public, or for other public use."
'85
Subsequently the state conveyed to the Biloxi Bridge and Park
Commission fee simple interest in approximately 150 acres of
submerged lands in the Mississippi Sound adjacent to the is-
land.8 6 The Park Commission had already purchased 12 1/2 acres
of land, with accretions, on the west end of Deer Island.
At issue was the ability of the state to convey fee simple
interest in public trust tidelands to private parties for private
purposes. In reaching an affirmative answer, the court consid-
ered two sub-issues: (1) did the proposed project violate section
81 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 prohibiting the ob-
struction of navigable waters, and (2) did the sale of submerged
lands violate the common law public trust doctrine?
8 7
As to the "obstruction" issue, the court found that filling of
the submerged lands in question would have no tangible effect
upon the right of the public to use navigable waters of the
state.88 In fact, navigation would be aided because existing chan-
nels in Biloxi Bay would be widened and deepened to provide
the necessary fill material.89 Therefore, section 81 was not vio-
lated.90 This position represented a retreat from an earlier hold-
ing of the court that section 81 is applicable to all tidal waters
regardless of actual navigability.9 1 It is unclear what legal princi-
ple this distinction is based upon. The court offhandedly rele-
gated to dicta the holding that the purpose of section 81 was to
prohibit the alienation of tidelands for private purposes.92 The
court's language implies that incremental obstructions will be
permitted when overall navigation in the state is furthered.93
85 Id.
86 Id. The Biloxi Park Commission intended to undertake a project for development
of the island as a means of expansion for the city. The island was to be connected to the
mainland by a bridge. Approximately 27% of the island was to be devoted to public uses,
and 50 to 53% to residential, commercial and resort development. Id. at 630-31.
87 Id. at 631-33.
88 Id. at 631.
89 Id. at 632.
80 Id. at 632. "The context of section 81 is directed toward free navigation. It has
nothing to do with the alienation of mud flats and waters not suitable for navigation in
fact, or the sale of submerged lands." Id.
91 Culley v. Pearl River Indus. Comm'n, 234 Miss. 788, 108 So. 2d 390 (1959).
92 Treuting, 199 So. 2d at 632.
9' "The filling of the submerged lands in question will have no tangible effect on the
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Next, the court discussed the issue of whether such a sale
was in contravention of the public trust doctrine. In upholding
the sale, the court found that the legislature was justified in au-
thorizing the sale of these lands to private individuals as "inci-
dent" to the overall public interest and purpose." Because no
substantial interference with the original purposes of the trust
would occur, the trust was not violated.95 "If the totality of the
development promotes the public interest in general, the inci-
dental private ownership of individual lots does not negative
[sic] the comprehensive public purpose." '96 The public purposes
served by the development, as recognized by the court, were
"commerce, tourism, recreation, and accommodation of an ex-
panding population. ' 97 The court concluded that the proposed
development was not inconsistent with formerly established
trust purposes, i.e., navigation, fisheries, and commerce.98
Six years later, the court modified the stance it had taken in
Treuting. International Paper v. Mississippi State Highway
Department99 arose from the Highway Department's proposed
construction of Interstate 10 across property on Lowry Island
that International Paper claimed to have acquired by mesne
conveyances in 1967. °° International Paper and its predecessors
had paid taxes on the property since 1884, when it was first sold
pursuant to an act of the legislature.101 The land in question was
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide in 1817 when Mississippi
entered the Union. In addition, some of the land had formed by
accretion from the floor of the bay. The issue before the court
was whether the legislature had authority to convey in fee sim-
ple the marshlands and accreted lands on Lowry Island for pri-
vate benefit.
The court first addressed the issue of accretion. It found the
right of the public in waters of the state for fishing, boating and related endeavors." Id.





11 271 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1972).
100 Id. at 397.
101 Id. at 396-97.
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Guice holding inapplicable because in Guice the accreted land
was adjacent to the upland owner's property where as in the
case at bar the accreted land was noncontiguous. 10 2 Unable to
find authority applicable to the title of noncontiguous fast lands
which had emerged from tidal waters, the court decided, with no
discussion of its rationale, that such lands were owned and held
by the state in trust for the public in the same manner as sub-
merged tidelands. 0 3
The court then turned to the ability of the legislature to
convey title to private parties. As could be expected, Interna-
tional Paper relied upon Treuting to support its claim. But the
court, in another philosophical about-face, characterized Treut-
ing as an exception to the general rule prohibiting sale of trust
lands. 104 Having thus limited the Treuting decision to its facts,
the court was free to hold the 1884 sale invalid under the line of
decisions following Money.1 5
How can the above cases be reconciled into a coherent state
policy regarding the alienation of public trust tidelands? The
following principles can be derived from the case law. First, the
state is clearly prohibited from selling trust lands to private per-
sons for private purposes. Arguably this principle is the reason
that the Treuting court had to strain to find a "totality of public
purpose" rationale for approving the sale of public lands for
what was clearly private development. Second, the state may
convey fee simple title to private persons if the conveyance is
consistent with the public purposes of the trust and the sale is
made pursuant to general legislation. 06 Purposes of the trust
have evolved over time to include commerce and navigation,
0 7
fishing, 0 a bathing, swimming, and other recreational activi-
ties, 09 and development of mineral resources." 0 The legislature
"0' Id. at 398.
103 Id. at 398-99.
' Id. The court distinguished Treuting as being exceptional since it involved spe-
cial legislation directed to a particular area, and more importantly, the resulting public
purpose substantially outweighed the public interest. Id.
105 Id.
l06 See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
101 Martin, 34 Miss. at 37.
108 Stewart, 184 Miss. at 231, 184 So. at 50.
109 Trueting, 199 So. 2d at 632-33.
110 Id. at 633.
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has expanded these to include the preservation of wetlands in
their natural state. 1 ' However, because the court has for the
most part rejected efforts to privatize public tidelands, case law
provides little guidance on how the state can assure such
consistency.
One writer has argued that private ownership of public trust
lands for private purposes need not be antithetical to public
rights in such lands. He therefore questions the court's reluc-
tance to allow divesture. 1" 2 He suggests that the public interest
can be protected when public land is sold by imposing a public
trust easement on the property.' He further advocates that in
limited circumstances, such as when land is incapable of public
use, it should be subject to sale free of the trust."4 Although his
proposal has some logical appeal and has precedent, this outlook
ignores one of the most important purposes of the trust - pro-
tection of resources contained in public lands. As a matter of
policy, private ownership is a poor way to guarantee this protec-
tion. Without extensive land-use regulation and enforcement, it
is unlikely that a private owner will consistently make decisions
concerning property that sufficiently weigh the public's interest.
In addition, such regulation is rarely welcomed by private
landowners.
A better approach would be to prohibit totally the disposi-
tion of public tidelands in fee simple to private parties. The
state already has extensive regulatory powers that are well-
adapted to accommodating the needs of private parties and the
public in coastal resources. The Coastal Wetlands Protection
Law"15 and accompanying regulations incorporated in the Mis-
sissippi Coastal Program"' establish a permit system for certain
activities that are detrimental to the wetland ecosystem. The
.' MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-27-3 (Supp. 1987).
112 Comment, The Mississippi Public Trust Doctrine: Private and Public Rights in
the Coastal Zone, 46 Miss. L.J. 84, passim (1975).
Id. at 111.
' Id. at 112.
'5 Coastal Wetlands Protection Law, Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-1 (Supp. 1987).
11. Wetlands Management, Mississippi Coastal Program Ch. 8, § 2 (Rev. 1983)(ad-
ministrative rules, regulations, and procedures adopted to further aims of Coastal Wet-
lands Protections Law) [hereinafter Wetlands Management Regulations].
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law is designed to further a legislatively declared public trust
policy of preserving the "natural state of the coastal wetlands
and their ecosystems and to prevent the despoliation and de-
struction of them, except where a specific alteration of specific
coastal wetlands would serve a higher public interest in compli-
ance with the public purposes of the public trust in which
coastal wetlands are held.
117
The Coastal Program was envisioned by its creators as a ve-
hicle for protecting valuable coastal resources without hamper-
ing the state's potential for economic growth. This is accom-
plished by regulating growth away from more fragile coastal
resources while encouraging economic development in areas
more capable of accommodating it with the least amount of al-
teration of the wetlands ecosystem. Under the permit review
system in the Coastal Program, activities of private parties will
be allowed to encroach into public tidelands only so long as the
public interest is accommodated. 1 8 It provides private owners a
,,. Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-3 (Supp. 1987).
"' Wetland Management Regulations, supra note 116. The rules and regulations
regarding wetlands management were adopted to carry out state policies as announced in
Mississippi Code sections 49-27-3 and 57-15-6. Wetlands Management Regulation, supra
note 116, at Ch. 8 § 2 (I)(A).
It is declared to be public policy of this state to favor the preservation of
the natural state of the coastal wetlands and their ecosystems and to prevent
the despoliation and destruction of them, except where a specific alteration of
specific coastal wetlands would serve a higher public interest in compliance
with the public purposes of the public trust in which coastal wetlands are held.
MIss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-3 (Supp. 1987)
In recognition of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, as amended,
the [Marine Resources] Council is directed to prepare and implement a coastal
program that establishes guidelines and procedures pursuant to the following
goals:
(a) To provide for reasonable industrial expansion in the coastal area and to
insure the efficient utilization of waterfront industrial sites so that suitable
sites are conserved for water dependent industry;
(b) To conserve the resources of the coastal area for this and succeeding gener-
ations in accordance with the public policies expressed in sections ... 49-27-3
..... Mississippi Code of 1972; ...
MIss. CODE ANN. § 57-15-6(1)(Supp. 1987)
In deciding whether or not a permit should be granted authorizing a regulated activ-
ity, it is the state's position that "[p]reference is to be given to preserving the coastal
wetlands in their natural state, and that the burden of demonstrating the higher public
interest in altering wetlands rests with the party proposing the alteration." Wetlands
Management Regulations, supra note 116, at Ch. 8, § 2(I)(E).
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means of using public trust lands without having to obtain fee
simple title, while simultaneously protecting the public interest.
This obviates the need to transfer ownership to private parties.
PROTECTED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE USES
1. Common Law
An uneasy tension exists between public and private uses in
protected nearshore waters. In 1904, the court in Barataria Can-
ning Co. v. Ott"9 had the opportunity to distinguish between
the rights of littoral/riparian2O owners and the public in natural
resources in the waters adjacent to their property.' 21 The case
involved leasing oyster beds off waterfront property on the Mis-
sissippi Sound. Ott, a riparian owner, leased waterfront property
to Barataria. Subsequently, the Harrison County Board of Su-
pervisors granted Barataria the right to plant and harvest oys-
ters from the water bottoms adjacent to the leased property. Ott
later conveyed the lot to Barataria, with the proviso that Bara-
taria would cancel and surrender the lease and pay Ott $6,000.
The deed reserved in Ott the littoral and aquatic rights appurte-
nant to the property. The issue before the court was whether
this reservation resulted in Ott having a property right in the
oysters.
In its opinion, the court stated unequivocally that landown-
ers abutting the Sound possess the same right as the public to
fish and gather oysters from waters in front of their property.
22
Therefore, the right to harvest oysters was not a littoral right.
The court then enumerated some rights incident to littoral own-
ership which include "the privilege of landing his boats, hauling
his nets, the gathering of seaweed and shells, and taking sand
from the beach between the high and low water marks."'2M Next,
"' 84 Miss. 737, 37 So. 121 (1904).
10 Riparian owners are those whose land borders on a water course. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1192 (5th ed. 1979). Littoral owners are those whose property borders on an
ocean, sea, or lake. Id. at 842. The two terms are often used interchangeably.
Barataria Canning Co. v. Ott, 84 Miss. at 752-54, 37 So. at 123-24.
Id. at 752, 37 So. at 123.
lO Id. at 752-53, 37 So. at 123. The court noted that some jurisdictions protect, in
addition, a right to erect wharves, piers, and bathhouses in the water fronting property.
Id. The Martin court expressly denied such rights as incident to littoral ownership in
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the court acknowledged the right of the county to lease to pri-
vate parties submerged lands for a term of 25 years for the pur-
pose of oyster farming.124 The lessee, a non-riparian owner, ac-
quired a vested private property right in the oysters that he
"banked, planted, and cultivated" within the lease area. 12 5 Be-
cause this right arose from a legislative rather than common law
littoral power, Ott could not acquire the right to the oysters
through reservation in the deed.
The public, including the littoral owner, presumably re-
tained common rights such as fishing and navigation in the
leased area, so long as doing so did not unreasonably interfere
with the lessee's lawfully conducted oyster business.'2 6
Fifty years elapsed before the court again dealt with littoral
rights. Crary v. State Highway Commission 27 involved property
that Crary owned adjacent to the Bay of St. Louis in the Missis-
sippi Sound. By statute, he had been granted the privilege of
planting and gathering oysters and erecting bathhouses and
other structures in front of his land for a distance of 500 yards
from the low water mark. 2 8 Later the state constructed a bridge
across the Bay of St. Louis. As a result, Crary was unable to
exercise these privileges. He claimed that such action amounted
to a taking of his property for public use without just compensa-
tion. 129 The state claimed that since it had merely imposed an
additional public use on property already set aside for a public
purpose no unconstitutional taking had occurred. 30
The court concurred with the state's position, holding that
Mississippi. Martin, 34 Miss. at 36. The court also intimated that littoral rights are so
inextricably bound to the property that they are legally incapable of separation. Bara-
taria Canning Co., 84 Miss. at 753, 37 So. at 123.
124 Barataria Canning Co., 84 Miss. at 753-54, 37 So. at 124.
126 Id. at 754, 37 So. at 124.
1"0 "They [littoral owners] had the right to use the beach and water front of their
property in any manner which would not interfere with the business of their lessee car-
ried on upon the leased premises." Id.
1 219 Miss. 284, 68 So. 2d 468 (1954).
128 Id. at 287-88, 68 So. 2d at 468.
129 Id. at 288, 68 So. 2d at 469. "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use, except on due compensation being first made to the owner or owners thereof,
in a manner to be prescribed by law..." Miss. CONST. art. III, § 17.
130 Crary, 219 Miss. at 289, 68 So. 2d at 469.
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the state simply granted a revocable license. "1 To hold other-
wise, the court said, would be a violation of the state's constitu-
tional and common law public trust responsibilities.1 3 2 Because
Crary held only a revocable license, no private property was
taken. Therefore, the right to farm oysters and erect structures
in waters adjacent to one's property is not a littoral right. Even
though the rights at issue in this case were granted by statute,
the court's language is sufficiently broad to include other littoral
rights that attached at common law.
The damage sustained results not from a taking of the riparian
owners' privileges in the Bay, but from the lawful exercise of
the state's power to which this property has always been sub-
ject, and which has always been owned by the state as trustee
for the people. It is this primary and superior title of the state
as trustee for the people which frees the state from any liabil-
ity to appellants in constructing this bridge. When the state
implemented its title and responsibilities as trustee, for the
public, by constructing this bridge, it was exercising its para-
mount power and superior title in the waters of and soil under
the Bay of St. Louis, rather than taking the private property of
anyone. 
1 3
Later that same year, in Xidis v. City of Gulfport, the
court dealt with the extent of state power to authorize a project
that obstructed a littoral owner's access to water.135 Xidis owned
and operated a restaurant on U.S. Highway 90 bordering the
Mississippi Sound. He had spent large sums of money advertis-
ing the restaurant as being on the beach. However, the city of
Gulfport's development of a small craft commercial harbor in
front of his restaurant as part of an expansion plan for the Port
of Gulfport allegedly obstructed the restaurant's waterfront
view, as well as deprived him of other littoral rights such as ac-
... Id. at 293, 68 So. 2d at 471. "Code Sec. 6066, when construed consistently with
these decisions (Money and Stewart) and Const. sec. 81, simply granted to appellants a
revocable license of the privilege to plant and gather oysters and to build bathhouses and
other structures." Id. (parenthetical added).
132 Id.
133 Id.
221 Miss. 79, 72 So. 2d 153 (1954).
131 Id. at 91, 72 So. 2d at 158.
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cess to the water, boating, bathing, and fishing. He brought suit,
claiming an illegal taking of his littoral property rights.-i
6
First, the court ruled that the city of Gulfport was acting
under properly delegated legislative authority when it approved
and began construction of the harbor.13 7 The city therefore pos-
sessed the same rights as the state as trustee of the submerged
lands in question.3 8 Citing Crary, the court held that rights of
riparian owners in public trust tidelands are subordinate to
rights of the state.' 9 Because the commercial harbor was a legit-
imate additional use of public trust lands, designed to benefit
the public, no taking occurred. 140 The court indicated, however,
that future erection of commercial structures in the harbor could
result in actionable injury to Xidis."' Arguably, then, the state
is limited in uses of public trust lands that cause detriment to
an adjacent upland owner. Unfortunately, the court gave no
guidance on what must be considered in balancing public and
private rights.
Eighteen years later, the court in its Guice decision took a
strong stand in favor of littoral rights of a property owner. As
mentioned earlier, Guice arose over public use of beach property
in Harrison County.' 42 The beach had been constructed with the
use of public funds and was intended for public use. The Guices
claimed, however, that, as a result of the doctrine of artificial
accretion, the beach belonged to them. In its opinion, the court
recognized littoral property rights of navigation, boating, swim-
ming, fishing, exclusive access to the water, and the right to ac-
cretions to upland property."13 It intimated that state actions
which would result in loss of one of these rights would be a tak-
131 Id. at 93, 72 So. 2d at 159. The court rejected that argument on the basis that
commercial harbor use was important to the port and therefore was an aid to navigation
rather than an obstruction of navigable waters, and that "[t]he right of access of a ripa-
rian owner may not prevail as against the state or its grantee in the exercise of the lawful
use or purpose .... " Id. at 90-91, 72 So. 2d at 158.
"' Id. at 91, 72 So. 2d at 158.
138 Id.
139 Id.
04 Id. at 93, 72 So. 2d at 159.
'4 Id. at 95, 72 So. 2d at 160.
142 Guice, 244 Miss. at 100-03, 140 So. 2d at 839-40.
113 Id. at 106-07, 140 So. 2d at 842.
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ing of private property, requiring the payment of just
compensation.
144
The court distinguished Crary and Xidis primarily on the
grounds that the plaintiffs in those cases did not seek damages
for interference with access to the water.145 This distinction, al-
though not persuasive, is not surprising. It should be recognized
that the issue in the Guice case was as much civil rights as pub-
lic trust. Because it arose over the use of Harrison County
beaches by blacks at a time when the civil rights movement was
in its infancy, it is arguable that the result is also a reflection of
the segregationist mores of the time.
Five years later in Treuting the court reiterated its stand in
Guice. "Moreover, there is a private trust associated with the
submerged bottoms running in favor of the upland owner whose
lands border the line marked by the mean high tide line.' 4 6 Ac-
cording to the court, this private trust, presumably consonant
with common law littoral rights, includes an unobstructed view
and access to the water. 4 7 The precedential value of this case is
questionable, however. First, the court's statements on the pub-
lic trust are dicta. Second, as stated earlier, the case was re-
stricted to its facts by the court in International Paper.
As can be seen from the above discussion, the Mississippi
Supreme Court has not developed a consistent position on the
relative common law rights of public and private citizens in their
use of nearshore public trust waters. The Mississippi legislature,
however, has attempted to reconcile public and private interests
in this area. These will now be examined.
2. Statutory
A national movement emerged in the early 1970s to reduce
the growing loss of coastal wetlands to development pressures.
Congress responded with passage of the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act of 1972,48 which provides coastal states with incen-
"I Id. at 107-08, 140 So. 2d at 842.
145 Id. at 109, 140 So. 2d at 843.
146 Treuting, 199 So. 2d at 633.
147 Id. at 632-33 (quoting Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 799 (Fla. 1957)).
148 Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1987).
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tives to manage their coastal areas through implementation of
federally approved coastal zone management programs. During
this period, the Mississippi legislature passed the Coastal Wet-
lands Protection Law of 1973."'0 The Act seeks to protect coastal
wetlands by requiring permits for certain activities. Coastal wet-
lands are defined in the law to include all public trust tidelands
located within Harrison, Hancock and Jackson counties.
150
The public policy of the Act is to preserve wetlands, except
when a specific alteration would serve a higher public interest.151
The regulatory system established to carry out this policy is con-
tained in the Mississippi Coastal Program.152 It delineates a pro-
cedure for issuing permits for the following activities: (1) dredg-
ing any type of material from wetlands; (2) filling any kind of
material either directly or indirectly, on or in the wetlands; (3)
killing or materially damaging any flora or fauna on or in any
coastal wetlands; (4) erecting on coastal wetlands any structure
that materially affects the ebb and flow of the tide; and (5) er-
ecting any structure on sites suitable for water-dependent indus-
try.153 In addition to identifying regulated activities, the Coastal
Program includes a wetlands use plan, which divides coastal
wetlands into five types of use districts: commercial, industrial,
general, preservation, and special use. Within each district, only
certain types of activities are eligible for a wetlands permit.1
5 4
Permits are issued by the Bureau of Marine Resources, fol-
lowing approval by the Commission on Wildlife Conservation.
155
In considering an application, the Bureau examines several as-
pects of a project. First, the proposed project's effect on the
public interest is evaluated by reviewing applicable legislative or
149 MIss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-3 (Supp. 1987).
'50 Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-5(a) (Supp. 1987).
," Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-3 (Supp. 1987).
161 See supra note 118.
153 MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-27-5 (Supp. 1987).
154 Wetlands Management Regulations, supra note 116 at Ch. 8, § 2(IV).
'5' MIss. CODE ANN. § 57-15-6 (Supp. 1987). The Coastal Wetlands Protection Law
and Coastal Program are administered by the Mississippi Commission on Wildlife Con-
servation through the Bureau of Marine Resources, a subdivision of the Department of
Wildlife Conservation. Where the Bureau is referred to hereinafter, it should be under-
stood to include the authority of the Commission, unless the context clearly indicates
otherwise.
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judicial definitions of public interest. Also reviewed are applica-
ble coastal use and special management area plans, precedent-
setting effects of the proposed activity, the national interest, and
public comments. Second, the degree of ecosystem alteration is
assessed by analyzing reasonably anticipated, direct and indirect
effects of the project on the ecosystem. Also evaluated are the
extent to which adverse impacts can be avoided through modifi-
cations, and the extent to which natural scenic qualities will be
preserved. Third, economic benefits of the proposed project are
evaluated by examining the extent to which adverse impacts can
be avoided through modifications, safeguards or other condi-
tions; the availability of alternative sites; and the extent to
which a waterfront location is necessary for the proposed use.
156
When the Mississippi legislature passed the Wetlands Law,
it exempted certain activities, areas, and entities from all but
the public policy provision of the statute.157 Included in these
exemptions are, among others, activities that occur within five
feet of private property; recreational activities that do not ad-
versely affect wetlands; shellfishing when otherwise legally per-
mitted; normal maintenance and repair of bulkheads, piers, and
roads; and exercise of riparian rights by a landowner. ' 58 Each of
these exemptions involves in some way littoral rights of upland
owners.
This provision has been a source of confusion and some con-
troversy as some have claimed that it constitutes a blanket ex-
emption from the Act.' 9 The Bureau has interpreted this sec-
tion to remove the exempted entities and activities from the
formal permit process only. According to the procedure set out
in the Coastal Program, the Bureau must be notified of any ex-
empted activities which would otherwise be regulated. Within
IS' In cases where unauthorized work affecting wetlands occurs, an after-the-fact
permit may be applied for. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-27-51 (Supp. 1987). The Bureau must
issue such a permit if the work was conducted in accordance with the public policy of the
Wetlands Law and the pertinent provisions of the Coastal Program. Miss. CODE ANN. §
49-27-51 (Supp. 1987). This determination is made by utilizing the same factors used in
reviewing other permits. Id.
" MIss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-7 (Supp. 1987).
158 Id.
'59 C. JARMAN & C. MILLS, A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF MISSISSIPPI'S COASTAL WETLANDS
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 16-23 (1984).
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thirty days of such notification, the Bureau is required to make
a finding that the proposed activity is in fact excluded and is in
accordance with the public policy of preserving wetlands. The
analysis used by the Bureau in making this decision is the same
as for a permitted activity.1 60 Absent such a finding, the project
cannot go forward. 61
How, then, do the Coastal Wetlands Protection Law and
Coastal Program affect the legal status of common law littoral
rights? As can be seen from the above discussion, the court has
recognized littoral rights. These include landing boats, hauling
nets, gathering seaweed and shells, and taking sand from the
beach between the high and low water mark. In addition, a litto-
ral owner has the right to an unobstructed view, access to the
water, and use of the water for navigation, boating, swimming,
and fishing. Finally, accretions to upland property are granted to
the owner as littoral rights.162 Note, though, that the broad pub-
lic policy statement of the Act creates a presumption that favors
public rights over private rights in wetlands when the conflict
would result in damage to or destruction of tidelands. Such a
presumption does not clearly exist at common law.163
Although private littoral rights are subordinate to public
rights, the law and accompanying regulations recognize and ac-
commodate these rights by exempting some activities associated
with them from the formal permitting process. Arguably this
language is broad enough to include common law as well as stat-
utorily granted littoral rights. In addition, it expands an upland
owner's property rights to include the construction and mainte-
nance of piers, bathhouses, and similar structures that don't sig-
nificantly interfere with the flow of the tides. The law appears to
have no affect on the exercise of littoral rights that do not alter
wetlands, such as boating, swimming, fishing, and viewing the
water. In addition, it does not change the law with respect to
granting accreted lands to the upland owner as the law applies
only in publicly-owned wetlands. Other rights, to the extent that
160 Wetlands Management Regulations, supra note 116 at Ch. 8, § 2(II)c.
161 Id.
"2 See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
103 See supra notes 120-147 and accompanying text.
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they adversely affect tidelands, are now subject to the review
procedure established in the Coastal Program.
CONCLUSION
The public trust doctrine in Mississippi continues to be a
fluid one. Because of the erratic nature of the court's rulings, it
is difficult to discern a coherent and consistent policy behind the
doctrine. One reason for this is that the court has never ex-
pressed a clear sense of purpose for the public trust concept.
As stated earlier, the public trust doctrine developed origi-
nally to preserve in the public rights to fishing and navigation in
tidal waters.1 4 Since then, the goals of the doctrine have broad-
ened into a duty to manage all natural resources included in the




In other words, the trust mandates an ecological ethic in coastal
decision-making that maintains an environmentally sound tide-
lands ecosystem. The legislature has codified this duty in the
Coastal Wetlands Protection Law which is based upon a princi-
ple of preserving coastal wetlands in their natural state.16
Keeping this duty in mind, the following principles should
evolve in Mississippi's public trust jurisprudence. First, the state
should be prohibited from granting fee simple interest in public
trust lands to private parties. Second, public trust lands should
remain the property of the state, even if they lose their charac-
ter as wetlands. Third, exclusive private use of public trust lands
should be viewed with skepticism, and allowed only when the
likelihood of conflict with public use of the land is minimal and
the environment will not be significantly degraded by the pri-
vate use. This includes decisions regarding upland activities that
have a high degree of potential for degrading the tideland envi-
ronment. Fourth, sufficient provisions should be made to guar-
antee public access to tidelands and their resources.
Such an interpretation of the public trust doctrine is consis-
tent with the goals expressed by the Mississippi legislature in
See supra notes 120-126 and accompanying text.
'" Jarmon, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 65 OR. L.
REv. 1, 26 (1986).
"' Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-3 (Supp. 1987).
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the Coastal Wetlands Protection Law and Coastal Program to
balance private development with the need to protect the re-
sources of the coastal environment.
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